Once Aryan Skynet Goes Live It Doesn't Matter Who Pulled The Switch
Aryan Skynet recently spotlighted the positive and nationalistic aspects of the program of Romanian Communist statesman Nicolae Ceausescu, whose conducatorship came to an end in December of 1989. Following the outbreak of disorder among the Hungarian minority in Timisoara and a genocidal crackdown by the government – or so the historical orthodoxy goes – a national “revolution” erupted, Ceausescu was deposed, and he and his wife, Elena, were given a hasty trial and executed on Christmas of that year. “Oh, what wonderful news!” an unknown broadcaster then announced over Radio Bucharest: “The Anti-Christ died on Christmas Day!” Favoring rather a different metaphor to describe the deposed leader, Carmen Burcea-Haber writes that many Romanians “now presume his colleagues decided to make him the sacrificial lamb and save their own skin.” The group usurping control of the government had christened itself the “National Salvation Front” – the natural foil to the hated Communist “Anti-Christ” – but was the “Romanian Revolution” as saintly as it pretended, and was it even Romanian in its origins and strength?
Rumors have persisted since 1989 that not only elements of the Romanian Securitate, but foreign state actors, as well, may have played roles in the toppling of the Ceausescu government. “The difference between the revolution in Romania and the other Central European countries was that it happened peacefully in the other countries. In Romania there was real chaos and thousands were killed in the crossfire,” Rupert Wolfe-Murray begins at The Huffington Post, continuing:
The problem is that many Romanians today believe that their revolution wasn’t a “real” one. They say it was a “Coup d’etat” – a seizure of power by a small clique of Communists, military leaders and KGB agents. […]
There is no doubt in my mind that Romania’s change of government in 1989 was a revolution – even if it was stage managed and the mob were manipulated. It has all the ingredients of a classic revolution: a total change of the political system; an angry mob; several days of chaos; armed groups fighting each other and a shadowy clique of power brokers arguing about who will take over.
Among the “shadowy clique” contingent was General Nicolae Militaru, “who was briefly to become defence minister after the revolution,” writes John Simpson, who reported on the Romanian situation for the BBC and was able to interview some of the players involved:
Trained at the Frunze military academy in Russia, where Soviet intelligence recruited a great many agents among the Eastern European cadets, Militaru began plotting actively against Ceausescu in 1984.
Three years later he felt ready to approach the Russians. He visited the Soviet consul in the Romanian port of Constanta and asked him what Moscow’s response would be if Ceausescu were to be overthrown. The consul left the room to consult Moscow. When he returned, he was smiling: “Comrade Militaru, the Soviet Union does not interfere in the domestic affairs of Romania.”
“I realised,” Militaru told us, “that the message was, do whatever you think you need to.” Together with Ion Iliescu and other disaffected, pro-Gorbachev figures, he formed the National Salvation Front, and sent a manifesto in its name to Radio Free Europe in the spring of 1989. The intention was to stage a bloodless coup against Ceausescu in February 1990. The conspirators would disable his bodyguards with tranquillizer guns, arrest him and put him on trial.
Like everyone else, they were taken by surprise when the uprising in Timisoara led to outright revolution in Bucharest a few days later. […]
Afterwards, Militaru never wanted to make any secret of the fact that he had plotted against Ceausescu. Others, however, tried to make him keep quiet about it. […]
As for Iliescu, his landslide victory at the polls in May 1990 gave him, and the National Salvation Front, full legitimation. For this reason, perhaps, Iliescu dislikes the suggestion that the Front first came to power through manipulation and conspiracy. “I don’t think revolutions can be organised by someone outside the process itself,” Iliescu told us. […]
In many ways though, he’s right. The revolution was much too big for a small group of men to hijack, and anyway the reform communism which the Front existed to promote was always a non-starter. The crowds in the square hadn’t thrown Ceausescu out in order to have a milder version of Marxism-Leninism imposed on them. There was a simple, unspoken trade-off: Iliescu and his friends were allowed to rule, but they had to do so in the way the crowd wanted. And what the crowds wanted was a return to capitalism.
The conspirators of the National Salvation Front had been less ambitious, less revolutionary in their intentions, “and most had been high-ranking officials under Ceausescu,” Simpson writes.
What united them was the fact that they had become disaffected, and wanted to get rid of him. Several had strong links with Mikhail Gorbachev’s Soviet Union, and wanted to create his kind of perestroika communism in Romania. […]
[Gorbachev’s former lieutenant, Eduard] Shevardnadze explained how Ceausescu represented a serious stumbling-block to Gorbachev’s plans for a new Europe. Like Erich Honecker in East Germany and Milos Jakes in Czechoslovakia, only worse.
“All these leaders had to go,” he said meaningfully, and described how Gorbachev and Ceausescu had had such a violent row not long before the revolution that the security men almost had to be called in.
So had the KGB been involved in Ceausescu’s overthrow?
“You can’t always tell with an organisation as secretive as that,” Shevardnadze said. “It’s possible; but to organise everything that happened in Romania was beyond the KGB’s capacity. This was a real expression of popular protest against the regime.”
Still, there was certainly a great deal of KGB activity in Romania that December. Virgil Magureanu, the former dissident who is now head of the SRI, the cleaned-up Romanian intelligence organisation which took over from the Securitate, invited us into his headquarters in Bucharest to talk about it.
“It was clear at the time,” Magureanu said, “that the Soviet special services, the KGB, put a great deal of effort not just into finding out what was going on in Romania, but also in carrying out ‘diversions’ against the former regime.”
Some of these people came in disguised as tourists, he said, and drove around in Russian cars; though he felt that this had been rather unprofessional of them.
Whatever the “diversions” they carried out – he wouldn’t elaborate – there were certainly several conspiracies among the Romanian armed forces […]
If, as Simpson suggests, Romania’s “revolution was much too big for a small group of men to hijack” – and if, as Shevardnadze indicates, “to organise everything that happened in Romania was beyond the KGB’s capacity” – then is it possible that forces other than the organic will of the Romanian people were responsible for the advantageously timed political upheaval?
There was, at the time, “the calculation, the estimation, that a strong American role in Europe would be an advantage from all perspectives and that this role would be even more important than the reunification of Europe itself,” concedes Robert Hutchings, who served on the National Security Council under George H.W. Bush. “Yes, even more important than the strengthening of Europe’s integration and by all means more important than the end of the Soviet threat. We considered that the reunification of Germany and the unification of Europe could be achieved in a way that would secure America’s leading role in Europe,” Hutchings adds – but, with Ceausescu’s Romania standing in the way of a European reunification, how was this consolidation of American power to be effected?
Susanne Brandstätter’s documentary Checkmate: Strategy of a Revolution, which aired on the German-language Arte television network in 2003, features interviews with Western intelligence officials revealing the utility of false flag activity, media deception, and the synthetic fomentation of unrest in the toppling of Ceausescu. French secret service agent Dominique Fonvielle, interviewed for this documentary, says:
How do you set up a revolution? I believe the first step would be to locate the enemy forces in a given country. It is sufficient to have highly effective intelligence service to determine which people are credible enough and have enough influence at their hands, to destabilize the population, to the disadvantage of the ruling regime.
Second point: One has to initiate an effective propaganda action from abroad, which tries to prove that this regime is in fact, hated by everyone, that it stands at the edge of the nations, that it has no right to call itself a liberal state and one has to show that the opposition movements that would come into existence, are legitimate.
The third point would be to prepare the future head of state, as one would have to replace the leader of the former regime. You have to prepare him. […]
The circumstances need to be prepared and eventually coordinated to spark a revolution. Therefore, these circumstances can be very different. The intelligence agency will work with information which would make a scenario seem credible, even though the information as such may be simply fabricated. In the case of Romania, I wouldn’t say that the first demonstration of Timisoara was staged. But there were happenings, in which the way things progressed were completely staged.
“Romania and its neighbour Hungary have historically tense relations,” Brandstätter further reveals:
The main controversial subjects are territorial claims of seven areas and the rights of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Western secret services made use of this conflict. They organised Ceausescu’s opponents in Hungary and Romania into a network. A Hungarian dissident, Enikö Bollobás, had close contacts with the so-called “diplomats” of the CIA. […]
The congregation of the Calvinist Pastor László Tökés is situated in the Romanian town Timisoara. Tökés is a representative of the Hungarian minority and is one of the first to raise his voice against Ceausescu. The proximity to Hungary and Yugoslavia made it easier for him to make his protests public.
“These people made a point that it was not a nationalist organisation, that they wanted to unite everyone who was anti-Ceausescu and pro-democracy,” says Bollobás.
They managed to recruit these prominent Romanian intellectuals. Writers, thinkers, philosophers and scientists. Those were the times, you know, when you would meet these diplomats under the bridges at midnight and come up with all sorts of cover stories. This little network in Romania managed to keep something cooking to prepare a climate, which would then, at least, give the context for the overthrowing of Ceausescu.
One of the frightening features of the “Romanian Revolution” was the presence of snipers – allegedly acting on behalf of a flailing, recklessly murderous, and megalomaniacal regime – who shot civilians in the streets of Bucharest. Gearoid O Colmain finds in this episode an early example of a pattern in which the countries targeted for regime change by globalist interests are suddenly beset with mysterious snipers:
During Boris Yeltsin’s counter-revolution in Russia in 1993, when the Russian parliament was bombed resulting in the deaths of thousands of people, Yeltsin’s counter-revolutionaries made extensive use of snipers. According to many eye witness reports, snipers were seen shooting civilians from the building opposite the US embassy in Moscow. The snipers were attributed to the Soviet government by the international media. […]
In 2002, the CIA attempted to overthrow Hugo Chavez, president of Venezuela, in a military coup. On the 11th of April 2002, an opposition March towards the presidential palace was organized by the US backed Venezuelan opposition. Snipers hidden in buildings near the palace opened fire on protestors killing 18. The Venezuelan and international media claimed that Chavez was “killing his own people” thereby justifying the military coup presented as a humanitarian intervention. It was subsequently proved that the coup had been organized by the CIA but the identity of the snipers was never established. […]
During the destabilization of Libya, a video was aired by Al Jazeera purporting to show peaceful “pro-democracy” demonstrators being fired upon by “Gaddafi’s forces”. The video was edited to convince the viewer that anti-Gaddafi demonstrators were being murdered by the security forces. However, the unedited version of the video is available on YouTube. It clearly shows pro-Gaddafi demonstrators with green flags being fired upon by unknown snipers. The attribution of NATO-linked crimes to the security forces of the Libyan Jamahirya was a constant feature of the brutal media war waged against the Libyan people.
“Brandstätter’s film is a must see for anyone interested in how Western intelligence agencies, human rights groups and the corporate press collude in the systematic destruction of countries whose leadership conflicts with the interests of big capital and empire,” comments O Colmain. “This open and rare admission of Western sponsorship of terrorism was justified on the grounds of the ‘greater good’ brought to Romania by free-market capitalism,” he adds sarcastically. “It was necessary, according to the strategists of Romania’s ‘revolution’, for some people to die” – at Christmastime, no less – like lambs led by Judas goats.
[Read more Christmas jeer at Aryan Skynet: “A Hitler for the Eighties“; “Aryan Skynet Welcomes the Christmas Ghost of Saddam Hussein“]