Once Aryan Skynet Goes Live It Doesn't Matter Who Pulled The Switch
Certain peculiar details from the life of Fidel Castro have always been out of keeping with the popular image of the scraggly-bearded Third World communist revolutionary. In 1946, for instance, as his profile at the Internet Movie Database attests, Castro appeared as an extra in Easy to Wed and Holiday in Mexico, two motion pictures filmed at MGM Studios in Culver City, California. Cuban investigator Servando Gonzalez makes the provocative accusation that it was shortly after this that the future dictator of Cuba was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency. Gonzalez contends that Castro served the purposes of the Council on Foreign Relations, with Cuba functioning as a base of operations for the destabilization and subversion of other countries in Latin America and elsewhere in the developing world – all for American corporate interests. According to this interpretation, the Bay of Pigs invasion was intended to fail and to weaken the genuine anti-Castro organizations. The Cuban missile crisis might even have been an elaborate ruse of some sort.
Was there, perhaps, an additional motive for installing Fidel Castro in Cuba? Mere months after the toppling of Fulgencio Batista – and almost exactly a decade before a generation of young Americans would see countercultural icons Peter Fonda and Dennis Hopper smuggling cocaine in Easy Rider – reporter Victor Riesel published an article titled “Cocaine Factor in Revolution”.
The voice of Cuba is not psychotic. It is narcotic. Fidel Castro is speaking from behind a cocaine curtain. There is more of this powerful drug pouring into Cuba, and being used there today, than in the rest of the world. […]
Cuba’s supply ran from Peru and Bolivia to Mexico City and then to Havana. There the government watched its distribution – with the top command echelons getting the first share. The cocaine is churned into a paste. This is done in Peru and Bolivia where the coca leaves grow. The paste then is flown into Mexico for refinement.
Dominic Streatfeild, in his book Cocaine: An Unauthorized Biography, explains:
What little cocaine there was in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s was coming from a country that was, one way or another, to remain the linchpin of the American cocaine industry for the next fifteen years.
The key to Cuba’s role in the world cocaine trade was its position – less than an hour’s flight from the US mainland. As Latin America curves around the southern rim of the Caribbean basin, Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia stretch out along a semicircular arc – all within easy reach. In fact, if you wanted to design the perfect stop-off point for cocaine shipments on their way to the US from Latin America, you would be hard-pushed to invent somewhere more suitable than Cuba.
In 1965, Washington correspondents Robert Allen and Paul Scott reported that “Communist dope is a growing menace to U.S. and Free World security.” The authors cite Bureau of Narcotics sources claiming that “Red China’s dope is pushed in the U.S. and Latin America principally by agents of Fidel Castro” and that “Huge quantities of opium, morphine, heroin, marihuana and cocaine are peddled on assignment from Havana.” Despite Cuba’s proximity to Florida, Allen and Scott relate that the Cuban drugs were allegedly routed into the U.S. by way of a Mexican detour. They cite a case in which a Mexican smuggler, Francisco Samayoa Campos, introduced an undercover narcotics agent to his suppliers, Manuel Jose Gonzales and Jose Roca Perez, who were both Cuban nationals. Allen and Scott give a few additional details on what they characterize as cooperation between the Chinese and Cuban state drug enterprises:
Red China even exports “scientists” to Cuba, Albania and some areas of Africa to teach local Communists the techniques of poppy cultivation.
U.S. customs and immigration officials are on the alert for Castro agents trying to smuggle cocaine to the U.S. among Cuban refugees preparing to come to this country.
“Cuba has become a problem in this respect, and because of the smuggling of this drug by Cuban nationals, some of whom have been determined to be Castro sympathizers, we now find considerable quantities of cocaine in the United States, particularly here in Miami and in New York City,” Patrick P. O’Carroll, director of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics school, informed a seminar that same year.
Cold War anti-communist propaganda was frequently ridiculous, hyperbolic, filled with fabrications, and designed to promote an image of the Soviet Union and other Second World states as unified and omnipresent specters and threats to American life. For this reason, the foregoing newspaper reports should not be accepted uncritically; but, given the CIA’s half century and more of deep involvement with international drug smuggling operations, would a covert Castro-cocaine connection really be too wacky to countenance?
In light of such considerations as these, the meaning of the Mariel boatlift invasion of 1980, in which approximately 125,000 Cuban criminals were unleashed on unsuspecting Miami citizens in time for the excess of the “cocaine cowboys” years, takes on a radically different character. Indeed, William L. Marcy, in his book The Politics of Cocaine, writes:
Captured Cuban DGI agent and smuggler Mario Estevez Gonzalez testified that the Departamento de America and the DGI also infiltrated agents into the United States during the Mariel boatlift in 1980 to facilitate narcotics trafficking, spy on anti-Castro elements, or act as sleeper agents until a conflict between the United States and Cuba broke out. Thus, during the 1970s, while Cuba made overtures to the United States to cooperate on narcotics control, elements within Cuba’s intelligence community simultaneously cultivated a relationship with the Medellin cartel, which was busy setting up narcotics trafficking networks in the United States, particularly in Florida.
[…] In particular, Castro was accused of acting as the Medellin cartel’s mediator in its disputes with various entities, including the M-19 [guerrilla movement] and Panama’s military strongman, Manuel Noriega. Jose Blandon, an intelligence aide to Manuel Noriega who defected to the United States, reported that Castro believed that he needed “to have an influence over Colombia’s drug trafficking world” if he was going “to have influence over Colombia’s political world.” Thus, maintaining a relationship between the Medellin cartel and the various Colombian guerrilla groups was a significant policy goal for Cuba, which Manuel Noriega helped to fulfill.
Manuel Noriega led the intelligence branch (G2) of the Panama National Guard for Omar Torrijos. In this position, Noriega cultivated relationships with the CIA, Cuba, and the Medellin cartel during the mid-1970s. He often served as a go-between for the CIA and the Cuban DGI.
Riesel, in concluding the aforementioned article from 1960, made this colorful prognostication: “If ever the rock of Castro is over-turned there will be seen crawling a world sufficiently weird to out-horror George Orwell’s sadistic societies. And only 90 miles off shore.”